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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with [redacted] on MKNAOMI

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1. On 27 June I met with [redacted] in my office to discuss MKNAOMI in the hopes he could shed additional light on the tasking of that project and any operational support it possibly may have provided. [redacted] joined the Agency early in 1958 and served as Chief of the Biology Branch of TSD from September 1961 until January 1968 when he retired. He was personally deeply involved in the MKNAOMI project which was the responsibility of his branch. [redacted] of OGC, [redacted] of ORD, and [redacted] of OTS were also present during these discussions.

2. At the outset, [redacted] spoke very strongly of his need to maintain the cover with which he left the Agency in 1968. [redacted]

3. I began the interview by giving [redacted] a run-down on our understanding of the Ft. Detrick project and the image of that effort projected by the limited record of the MKNAOMI file. I pointed out that one of the clearly defined purposes of the project as stated in TSD documents was to maintain a stockpile of lethal agents and disseminating systems in readiness for operational use and that this in association with the current furor about assassinations had caused some obvious concern within the Agency about this program which had not been alleviated by available records. It was our hope that [redacted] could fill some gaps in our knowledge. He was told that whatever he could provide should be given on a complete voluntary basis and that he should feel free not to say anything if he so chose.

4. [redacted] responded immediately by stating that it was essential we understand that while discussions were held and work done on things that might appear questionable, there was a clear understanding among all involved that they would never actually be used operationally because of inherent stops built into the Agency approval system that assured final approval for use would never be given. Thus, he characterized the whole MKNAOMI effort as a kind of Never-Never-Land involving all sorts of unfettered discussion in isolation from reality. He provided

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full assurance that "the Company" had nothing to worry about: none of the lethal or incapacitating products of MKNAOMI had ever been made available to anyone for operational use.

5. Some time was spent questioning [redacted] about the requirements that shaped the MKNAOMI project. He stated that these had all been generated internally within TSD. He recalled no requirements having been levied by anyone within the Agency but not a part of TSD. Later in the interview, however, he noted that he had had discussions relevant to this matter with [redacted], but with no one else. He recalled no case in which requirements or direction were received from outside the Agency. It was simply the view of TSD that such a capability as NAOMI could provide was a reasonable one for the Agency to possess. Moreover, he noted that the inherent unreliability of biological agents and processes basically limited the utility of the NAOMI product. He pointed out that lots of work was done on incapacitants, none of which could be used because of an inability to find complete assurance that no serious lasting effects might result from their use. He contended at some length that the work done by Ft. Detrick was really defensive in nature. BW applications suitable for clandestine use were developed and tested only in order to understand the offensive threat the Agency faced. In some contradiction to this, however, he indicated that systems for use against dogs or for incapacitating humans were actually thought to be needed additions to the Agency's capabilities. In making his case for the defensive concerns of MKNAOMI he cited the vulnerability studies undertaken by Ft. Detrick.

6. [redacted] confirmed that the responsibilities of the Special Operations Division centered on the development and testing of special applications of BW weapons. Our relations were fairly informal and relied upon liaison between Ft. Detrick and TSD being conducted by a very limited number (several) of designated project officers. He also confirmed that virtually no written records on the project were maintained. Funding was provided by the Agency simply to support the overall activity of SOD and apparently was not accounted for on a tasking basis. [redacted] averred that the arrangement was based on the premise that work done in response to special Army requirements would be of interest to the Agency. This was particularly true since the Army Special Forces were SOD's principal customer and the Agency faced many of the same problems as this element of the Army. He left the impression that rather than provide tasking to Ft. Detrick, TSD simply selected developments of interest from an internally generated program. When asked about maintaining records of material transferred to the Agency, [redacted] responded that very little such material was in fact given to TSD and that it was unlikely any records were kept.

7. A considerable amount of time was spent questioning [redacted] specifically about the provision of agents or delivery systems developed at Ft. Detrick to operational elements of the Agency. He stated flatly that he had never had occasion to do so. [redacted] was shown a Ft. Detrick memo in the MKNAOMI file covering a conference with the Agency at which he was present which indicated he requested the Agency be provided with 5 staph. enterotoxin (food poisoning) tablets by 1 April 1962. He was asked the purpose of his request. [redacted] responded by

75-131

saying he was glad this specific question was asked since it enabled him to clarify what was obviously a source of some misunderstanding. It was his practice, he said, to levy such requests upon SOD with specific due dates simply to mask any possible future request which might be made for real operational purposes. Thus, periodic requests for material and delivery systems were made so that a purposeful one would not stand out as unusual. He further stated that the enterotoxin development was one the Army had been engaged in which we thought might be of use to us as a means for temporarily incapacitating guards. No mention was made of the obvious discrepancy between this view and the contention that our interests were purely defensive in nature. [redacted] was told that one of the schemes suggested for use against Castro involved the treatment of the inside of a diving suite with Madura Foot, a non-specific fungal skin disease. At the same conference as noted above, considerable attention was given to the development of Microsporum Gypseum (a fungal agent producing severe skin disease) and direction was reportedly given by [redacted] that it be prepared in a form suitable for dusting clothes, pillows, etc. He was asked if this direction was related to the Castro gambit. He stated categorically that it was not and was not related to any identified operational use of the agent. Rather, it was another example of the type of tasking he levied on Ft. Detrick. He claimed he had no knowledge of the diving suit affair or of any other plot to incapacitate or assassinate Castro -- or anyone else, for that matter. He did state later that tranquilizing materials obtained elsewhere but loaded into syringes at Ft. Detrick (because of the sterile facilities there) had been given to case officers for use in [redacted] On no other occasion had Ft. Detrick material been provided to the DDP.

7. The MKULTRA drug work came up a number of times. At the outset of the discussions, and repeatedly throughout them, he stated -- though not asked -- that he had no knowledge of any unwitting testing of drugs. Rather, animal tests and ultimate testing with human volunteers had been all that was required. In these cases well established test protocols had been used. He stated that this activity had been his principal concern.

8. [redacted]

9. [redacted] spent some time describing other activities apparently involving Ft. Detrick, though that was not always clear. These things included materials that would cause the rapid corrosion of metal products displayed at trade fairs, POL contaminants that would destroy petroleum stocks, reagents that would cause structural failures in a number of different materials, crop contaminants that would prevent their passing customs controls (e.g., unacceptably high DDT levels), etc. He knew of no actual uses of harrassment materials against targeted individuals as opposed to uses for crowd control or meeting disruption.

10. In summary, it must be said that the discussions with [redacted] were far from satisfying. Many of his responses appeared to be less than forthcoming

75-132

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and were not altogether believable in the light of information available elsewhere. Since he appears to be the sole accessible participant in the MKNAOMI project who was deeply involved in it during its most provocative period, there seems to be little more that can be done now in establishing the extent of support provided actual operations during the early 1960's.

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75-133